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IRRATIONALITY AND SACRIFICE IN THE vVELFARE 
REFORM CONSENSUS 
Dorothy E. Roberts''' 
·:'>, ~~ · •• ~ ~r· _., . 
/~ f '·i tmportan t CJL.<estwnm tne controversy over \Vell:are rel:orrnts 
r 'l... the state should address the problem of children's poverty. Liberals 
and conservatives approach this question with different philosophies 
about poor people's childbearing and the relationship between public 
assistance and children's welfare. Nevertheless, at least since the 1980s, 
liberals and conservatives have reached a consensus regarding welfare's 
social harms, the condemnation of recipients' (especially single mothers') 
irresponsibility, and the promotion of policies designed to reduce welfare 
dependency, such as work requirements and tougher enforcement of 
child support obligations. New Republican proposals to slash drastically 
welfare for children threaten to shatter this consensus and have sent 
policymakers in search of a new "middle ground."1 
Professor Stephen Sugarman's article, Financial Support of Children 
and The End of Welfare As We Know It,2 makes an important contribu-
tion to the welfare debate by demonstrating the unfairness of our system, 
which gives dignified and generous Social Security benefits to children of 
deceased fathers while doling out stigmatized and inadequate AFDC 
benefits to children of absent fathers. Sugarman's proposaL however, 
retains critical elements of the system's unfairness. While rejecting major 
parts of the conservative agenda, Sugarman proposes a child support 
assurance scheme that might please conservatives and liberals alike. Yet 
once Sugarman refutes the conservatives' irrational premises, we are left 
with this fundamental question: does the state have an obligation to guar-
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark; B.A., Yale College; J .D., 
Harvard Law School. This Commentary benefited from the suggestions of participants at 
the New Directions in Family Law Symposium, held at the University of Virginia School of 
Law, and the symposium on Welfare As We'd Like It To Be, held at Princeton University. 
It also benefited from discussions with Lucie White's Social Welfare Law class at Harvard 
Law School and the H arva rd University Program in Ethics and the Professions seminar. I 
am grateful to the Program in Ethics and the Professions for its research support. 
1 See, e.g., David Whitman & Matthew Cooper, The End of Welfare-Sort of, U .S. 
News & World Rep., June 20, 1994, at 28 (discussing President Clinton's welfare reform 
proposal, The Work and Responsibility Act of 1994). 
2 See Stephen D. Sugarman, Financial Support of Children and The End of \Nelfare As 
We Know It, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2523 (1995). 
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an tee at least a minimal level of welfare to all child re n ?3 I see less room 
for compromise on this issue . than Sugarm2.n does. V!hen liberals have 
made concessions in the past, they have consistently sacrificed the inter-
ests of the most vulnerable children, especially black children. Even so , it 
• 1 1- d t" ' " ' 1 ' , 1- 1 " m1gnt ue argue uar olJgarman s proposa~ at le ast nas L1e acvantage ot 
:prc.cticability . \Vith th.:.t~t i:: 1~1 in. d , I 3l1,?.,SC3t Cin a l t~rnati "';e ·:;~r;2tegy for sus -
-~ :::.i ning ;:he pTc;gr•::: ssi\1t -:, ·is~ c_:;}~ of :;D : ~-Icl usi\·;-; aDC c! i grjf~ -:~c~ ':,··.:=;.~far-e systen1. 
1 . lZEJ E CTil'·!G (.=oNSE H.VAT IVE P r~E iviiSES 
A first step in analyzing the wisdom of compromising with conserva-
tives is to peel away the layers of fau lty reasoning that support their pro-
posals and see what remains . Sugarman notes several aspects of the 
conservative age nda that are so extreme that they leave no room for con-
sensus across ideological lines. I •nant to focus on three related conserva-
tive premises that should be rejected : that government support for poor 
children is itself a wrong, that poor people's dependence on welfare is 
immoral and socially harmful, and that financial support for children 
should be tied to marriage. 
A. Discouraging the Poor from Having Children 
Conservatives believe it is immoral to have children when one cannot 
afford to support them and therefore that the government should discour-
age such behavior.4 From this belief follows the conservative view that it 
is immoral for poor people to have children and that the government 
should discourage them from having children. This sounds suspiciously 
like social engineering, so some conservatives soften the claim by focus-
ing on allegations that welfare mothers misuse taxpayer m oney rather 
than discussing their right to bear children.5 Thus, to conservatives, the 
problem to be addressed by welfare policy is not procreation by the poor 
per se, but the irresponsible burden it im poses on hardworking taxpayers. 
3 This question may be seen as pa rt of a broader inqui ry in to the state 's obligation to 
:·edistribure wealth more radica lly and to ;·es t.- ucture inst itutions that create poverty in 
A.merica. Although I believe there are compelling moral and constitutional grounds for a 
redistributive vision beyond minimal we lfare entitl ements, I have constrained my 
argument to respond to the question Sugarm c..n 's ar ticle raises . Moreover, a bolder 
redis tributive project is likely to include sta te guarantees of fin ancial support for children. 
4 Suga rman, supra note 2, ac 2523,25. See a lso Christopher Jencks , Re thinking Socia l 
Policy: Race , Poverty and the Underclass 189,90 (1992) (discussing middle,class American 
norms regarding childbearing that the "reproduct ive underclass" violates) . 
5 See, e .g., 133 Cong. Rec. 35827 (Dec. 16, 1987) (stateme nt of Rep. Roukema) ("How 
rnuch longer do you think the tvvo,worker couple wi ll tol era te the we lfare state and its cost 
to them in taxes to support that welfare mothe ;·?") . 
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Conservatives avoid the more fundz:rnental question of i:he state 's obliga-
+1'r·1s ·ro"'"' -d" DOOr c'nl'lo'ren 1DY c11v" r:·;.,-,n qc·>p ~,,;,,~ f--,~-' ~L' •'J' -,~ ·,·: 1 .·": -_;_,--,-p_ c .Ji • v. u.l ;:, > - -' ' '-d< d . \6 G.H•~ -'-"-"'J.ll .d '~ H! - ·--- • _ --
SpOnSible behavior of poor parents. 
Conservatives assume not onlv that "oeoole res·ro o:nd r1ther strcmbulv to 
.; j_ l_ v 
i1 nancial incentives," as Sugam1an 6 but p:mrrns·~ 
7 
is refuted 
v studies have found no sigm 1c1c::;;J uons.t1ip oecween "vel-
i;ene i1 ts and family structu~e ." ::: \ '&st rrELjmity of v.;elfc:.re 
have only one or two children; in the 2vecage numbe:l' ol' child ren in 
~ family receiving welfare is somewh. at smaller than in farn.ilies th2.t do 
notY Moreover, fertility rates do not 2or:respond to the level of welfare 
benefits provided by the states. 10 In any event, it would be irrational for 
a woman on welfare to assume the tremendous costs and burdens of car-
ing for an additional child given the meager increase in AFDC payments 
that results.U 
A more plausible claim is that, although poor women do not become 
pregnant deliberately in order to receive AFDC benefits, they are more 
likely to become pregnant with the security of i~.._FDC benefi ts to re ly on 
than without them. The availability of \Yelfare lessens the fi nancial bur-
den poor women would otherwise have to bear in having children and 
therefore reduces their incentive to tal-ce every possible precaution 
6 Sugarman, supra note 2, at 2534. 
7 See, e.g., Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980, at 154-
66 (1984) (arguing that welfare shapes recipients' marital and reproductive decisions). 
s See Mimi Abromav itz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy From 
Colonial Times to the Present 353-54 (1988) (discussing the interaction between AFDC 
and family structure); William A. Darity & Samuel L. Myers, Does Welfare Dependency 
Cause Female Headship? The Case of the Black Family, 46 J. IVfarriage & Fam. 765, 773 
(1984) (concluding that " [t ]he attractiveness of we lfare and welfare dependency exhibits no 
effects on black female family heads"). See also Teresa L A mott, Black Women and 
AFDC: Making Entitlement Out of Necessity, in \Nomen, the State, and V/e!fare 280, 282-
84 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990) (examining the factors leading to the rise of single parent 
families in the black community). 
9 See Marian Wright Edelman, Families in Peril: "'''n Ag:: nda for Social Change 70-71 
(1987) (showing that the average number of children in a family rece iving AFDC is 1.9); 
Joel F. Handler, Two Years and You're Out, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 857, 861 (1994) (arguing that 
most welfare recipients do not have large numbers of children). See also IVlark R Rank, 
Fertility Among \Vomen on Welfare: Incidence ~md Determinants, 54 Am. Soc. ~~. ,::v . 296, 
298-300 (1989) (finding that At'~'DC mothe rs have lower ferti li ty ra tes than the ge!1era! 
public). 
10 Rank, supra note 9, at 303. 
11 See Theresa Funiciello, Tyranny of Kindness: Dismantling the Welfare System to End 
Poverty in America 57 (1993) (noting that "[t] he average per capita arnount of a we lfare 
grant decreases as the number of persons in the household increases "). 
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r- .r- ·-.... ..... r- ·a ..,..,.'"'Y"l~. 12 p.\ ... ,....("">.· ...... ., .. • c. ·'\If . 1 '{ K p v nl ... ~-"" ., ~,r,- ]' t~ agd.L\lSt rJh~gL!a.Hl-y. ..-.l.::i 1v•Jn::.ervanv,_, InlC.cey ~ aus ~-- lJl <HL">, LvV hn 
t. '~r: r · 1 · 1 ' k d l ' · ., ''""' ·~=-- ~-h-- 1n p_ace, young g1r s 100 aroun L1em ana :recogmze, per naps 
unconsciously , other girls in their neighborhood •.vho have had babies 
on their ovvn are surviving, however uncomfortably. "13 Thus, we lfare 
may not induce childbearing by indigent women, but reLls ing to provide 
\velfc.re :tnigi1t cJ.isc'_)~ _  :_~· ::u; ·:; i~. Yet this claim, \Vithout cor·~r:o~ing moral su1-
f-~~ ~=;~~i:: ~ .. - '£:~:~~ ~-; · -- ~ :.:· ~ :·~~·-·~:;_~: :i ng L?::\ }:;=3.ye:ts, b;ir1g:; L!S --~- -~ ~- -iu~~::.~ i ~;n 
ot \~u.tL; (; ·Live res _fJu.~·~ s i0 i t_~;~ y lor poor cftildren. -Const .i\,.ati '/CS .cnusr <.:dscj 
defend the (ierlic,I ;~).f ·iJeiieli"ts to children botTl to v.;ornen. C1'l \vclfare on 
B. The Immoraliry of Dependency 
Conservatives also advocate AFDC cutbacks on the ground that long-
term reliance on welfare is immoral and that the provision of welfare 
itself causes welfare dependency. 14 This is essentially an argument that, 
even if the state has a duty towards poor children, it serves these childre n 
better by denying assistance to their parents. The conservative view 
holds that the reliance of the poor on welfare (rather than poverty itself) 
causes social problems, including the perpetuation of welfare dependency 
into the next generation. Mothers who receive welfare are thought to 
teach their children a life of dependency by undermining their children's 
motivation to suooort themselves.15 
' ' 
Sugarman insightfully points out that conservatives assert no similar 
condern.nation of long-term dependency on inherited wealth, life insur-
ance proceeds, government agricultural subsidies, and Social Security 
benefits .15 Indeed, we do not view such reliance on government and 
12 Lee Anne Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in Distributive Justice: The Welfare 
Conundrum, 1994 Wis. L. R ev. 235, 289 (1994). 
13 i'VI ickey Kaus, The End of Equality 117 (1992). 
1-1 See , e .g., id. at 121; Lawrence M . Mead, The New Politics of Poverty: The 
Nonworking Poor in America (1992); Murray, supra note 7. But see Lucie E. White, No 
E xit: Rethinki ng "Welfare Dependency" from a Different Ground, 81 Geo. L.J. 1961 
(1993) (discussing and refuting the we lfare dependency thesis). 
15 This viorry about the intergenerationa l transmission of welfare depe ndency wgs 
reflected by Justice Clarence Thomas 's condemnation of his s ister 's rel iance on we lfare: 
"She gets mad when the mai lman is late with her welfare check. That's how depe ndent she 
is. What's worse is that now her kids feel entitled to the check too. They have no 
motivat ion for doing better or getting out of that situation." Clarence Page, Thomas' 
Sister 's Life Gives Lie to H is We lfare Fable, Chi. Trib., July 24, 1991, § 1, at 19. In fact , 
Thomas's si3ter, E mma Mae Martin, "worked two minimum-wage jobs wh ile her brother 
attended iav; school , bu t stopped \VOrking [for four or five years] to take care of an elderly 
aunt 'Nho had suffe re d a stroke ." Id. Both she and her eldest child were employed at th e 
time of Thomas 's appointment to the Supreme Court. See id. 
16 Sugarman, sup;a note 2, at 2538-42. 
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other types of financial assistance as "dependency" at all. As feminist 
scholars Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon observe, "[d}ependency . . . is 
an ideological term" that "carries strong emotive and visual associations 
and a powerful pejorative charge."17 As a result, what is considered 
"de pendency" has changed along with major social :c::nd economic trans-
f..-, ~-- 7-~ -~"t t" nnr- Tt "'\_." 0(' on 1 ~T \\' ; t-h the ,..;ca of ·[-,-i ~ <:: ;· - ~)· '"'l·) e r.-1r,~ -:-.-.J "IC:: ~--l t~'":)·"-1 +- i1 p A.\..1.\.d ! r..l ... ~....:.t l .:) . -~-'- " C'. ~ ) ..._ ) ..i J. l l. .~J.vC: !.. . l!UU ,J L ... u .~ ~ '-'- _;--'.:.t .Ci .-._ ._._! __ , _~ :.. :~ ! (J_ t, L~.._.. 
n l C <.~~-lillg ci· : ;~ c:,;~~)£:-lic ir.:.depe.ndence \~/ a ~ ,;:-~ p(·~n d·: .: ,__~: ~ ·)_ :~ .: ~-~:: yvlli te 
workinQman ·s \Va 2e la bor in addition co oropert;1 c '.-.- tit:rsl·li<J ctnd self-
.._... .____., [" ... l 
employmentY' P aupers, slaves and housewives , \\he wece excluded from 
w;::we labor, constituted the underside of tbe workin£man·s indeoendence 
0 ~ .< 
and were keot economicallv and ooliticallv dependent. 19 A s maJ· or forms 
J. J 1 .. "' 
of dependency deemed proper in industrial usage became objectionable, 
"dependency" became an increasingly negative term and with greater fre-
quency was attributed to the fault of the individual rather than the social 
structure. 20 
This distinction in the moral outrage directed at different types of 
dependency parallels the stratification of the American we lfare system 
into two basic categories: social insurance and what is commonly called 
" ·welfare ." Social insurance (Social Security and unemployment insur-
ance) provides a dignified entitlement to wage earners and their spouses 
and children, whereas welfare (mainly AFDC) doles out humiliating, 
undeserved relief primarily to poor single mothers. 21 Social Security 
retains its political popularity because it is perceived as an insurance pro-
gram despite its strong redistributive effects and its dependent cliems.22 
Because its beneficiaries are thought to recoup what they contributed to 
the program, they are neither stigmatized nor supervised. Thus, taxpay-
ers complain about supporting poor mothe~s on AFDC through their 
income taxes, but not about the transfer of their Social Security payments 
17 Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of 
the U.S. Welfare Sta te, 19 Signs 309, 311 (1994). 
1s Id. a t 316. 
19 Id. a t 318. 
20 Id. a t 324-25. 
21 Linda Gordon , P itied But Not En titled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 
1890-1 935, at 1-6 (1 994) . Welfare programs that give benefits to poor people from genera! 
federal and sta te revenues also include Food Stamps, Ge nera l Assis tance, Medicaid , and 
Supplemental Securit y Income. Eric R. Kingson & Edward D . Berkowitz, Socia l Securit y 
and Medicare: A Policy Primer 14-15 (1993). 
22 See Joel F. Hand le r & Yeheskel Hase nfeld , The Mora l Construction of Pover ty: 
\Veifare Reform in A merica 19 (1991); Kingson & Berkowitz, supra note 21, at 23 -25; 
G ilbert Y. Steiner, _he Sta te of Welfare 3 (1971) . Social Security it se lf encourages some 
dependencies while discouraging others. It "s ubve n[s ] ad ults' sense of re sponsibility for 
their parents" whil e promoting wives' dependence on their husbands ' wages. Fraser & 
Gordon, supra note 17, at 322. 
2612 1. 7" · • 7 n · vlrguua .L(lH' t<evlew 
to the vvidovvs and childre11 of deceased \vorkers, vvho may e·veri be rr1orf~ 
e.g • - 1 1 '1--"~ aruuent tl1an tile taxpayers w,1o support tnem.~"' 
Tne stratification of the Arne:rican welfare system becomes even more 
suspect if >.;;;e consider an even broader meaning of we lfare that extend:; 
beyond ~~FDC and Social Security. Lirtcia Gordon suggests that '~velfar·(2 
'
4could .. accurc:,t e1y r~::fc:r 1~0 aU of a z·0verr1rnent's contri.b:xt.~c: ns t~) 
- -~!'·- ··•· ··.< ) ~~- -!- ~ L -: ~ - ; ! ; ~, .-::->:;;: >=~}_ _; -·.>/O~lld inc:L ..~.de :--- ·r . 
·; ' 
\vuuld c~;veal thai :T1ost v./eifare helr)s i~\.lT1ericans \vho are i1 'J L i r~ £ (~t': ~: 
~~ -
poor.-·"' 
:Pohci~s---sucb as \vork requirerr.tents--founded on the fauJty prer:nisr:: 
t hat v.;elfare perpetuates pove-rty and dependency have fai led .26 ~f:.!,~re is 
widespread agreement that A FDC work requirements cannot possibly 
bring untrained and poorly educated women into financia l self-suffi-
ciency, especially in an economy with diminishing demand for unskilled 
workers that is structured against women.27 Workfare programs, which 
23 See Subrata N. Chakravarty & Katherine Weisman, Consuming Our C hildren ? . 
Forbes, Nov. 14, 1988, at 222, 225 (noting that "a remarkable number of Social Security 
recipients do not need the supplement"). In 1992, nearly four million children and 
caretaker parents received Social Security benefits tota lling about $14 billion. Stephen D . 
Sugarman, Reforming Welfare Through Socia l Security, 26 U . M ich. J.L. Ref. 817, 819-21 
(1993). Sugarman notes that ·• AfDC's budget was only fifty percent greater, even tho ugh 
its case load was three times larger." Id. at 822. 
24 Gordon , supra note 21, at 2. 
25 Of the $711 billion in federa l entitlement spending in 1992, AFDC accounted for less 
than $20 billion. D avid E. Rosen baum , Answer: Cut En titlements. Q ues ti on: But How?, 
N.Y. Times, june 8, 1993, at A22. See a lso Theodore R. Marmor, Jerry L. Mashaw & 
Phi lip L. H arvey, America's Misunders tood Welfare State: Persistent Myths, Enduri ng 
Realit ies 86 (1990) ("'At less than 4 percen t of total fed eral socia l we lfare spend ing, AFDC 
is fiscally an insubstantial part of the American we lfare sta te. "). A less explicit form of 
p ublic income transfers, those structured throug h the income tax system, be nefit higher 
income groups the most. Kingson & Berkowitz, supra note 21, at 14. 
26 Congress , at least forma ll y, has required mothers rece iving AFDC to enroll in work 
programs since 1971. See Jo hanna Brenner, Towards a Feminist Perspective on VVe lfare 
Reform, 2 Ya le J.L. & Femin ism 99, 115 (1989). Several states ha ve implemented 
programs that attempt to force we lfare recipients to work by cutting off benefits "!ftcr two 
years . Sec. e .g., Jason DeParle , Clinton Idea Used to Lim it Welfare: States Issue The ir 
Own Plans to P ut Two-Year C e1rbs on Those Gett ing Benefits, N.Y. Times, June 2 , 1993, at 
A 12. Section 202 of the House Republicans' Personal Responsibility Act similai"ly reqt1i res 
s tates to move we lfare recipients into work programs. H .R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Se~s. (1995) 
(hereinafter Pe rsonal Responsibility Act]. For both a description of mandatory ··HOd-: 
programs and an arg um ent th a t they impose involuntary servitude and therefme violate 
the Thirteenth A rncndmer:t, sec Julie A . Nice, Welfare Servitude, l Geo . .J . On Fighting 
Pove rty 340 (1993 ). 
27 See genera ll y M ildred Re in , Dilemmas of We lfare Policy: Why Work Strategies 
Haven't ·wor ke d (1982) (d iscussing various work strategies and the reasons for the ir 
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reqmre vvelfare recipients to hold state-c:rea.i:ed jobs fo r the ir bc;ne fi~s, 
cost the government more than the provision of cash benel-11:s 2nd Ieave 
poor mothers worse off economically: welfare recipients remain at the 
~ ...-- T-- ,....., 1 , .b t . t' d~ d . i ' • 1 /f; same ;-\r U \_ ieve i u mcur ne a ·ue costs m gmng to \Vorx .-C 
fvioreov~ r~ the 11nderlying belief that people receive vtel.f2.r ~  bec .au :>~ 
·~r:'J \\·ork 
g c,I _iulj::; ·,: i_! l~ :~· :..l i< ci fZJ. Ct l l'la t Ifl0 3"l V/ ::: .~.:. 
welf:o:rr: e itlv: r r:0n ti nuously or intermittentiy , ,,.;l-Jen (Dey ax~ a bi.; w gee 
• 7 -,, I , r h J i"' 1, . • 'I j ~ , • . ~ ') --··1 
JO Os.--- Lvl any~ \ \'Orne!1 \v ... lo \VOrK U~ i -tlme stll \ Lrve lTl p<Jver·;:y. -· :~ :~litiS, 
work disincentive that exists is not caused by overly ge:i'lerous vveifa:re 
benefi ts, bu~ [)~/ the r11iserable conditions of ~·~fa.ilabla full-tjt':'"'.:~ jotr)· !)OV-
erty wages, loss of welfare benefits, and inadequate child and health 
careY A s a result , reducing the need for AFDC will requi ~e dramatic 
economic and social changes, including aggressive job creation , a higher 
minimum wage (or a guaranteed minimum income), lower marginal tax 
rates on welfare recipients ' earnings , better schools and effe ct ive job 
training, subsidized child and health care , and elimination of inequa lities 
in the labor market-changes that conservatives are apparently unwilling 
to pursue .32 So, again, conservatives must confront the question vvhether 
the sta te has an obligation to support the children who vvill inevitably 
need financi al assistance. 
ineffec tiveness); IV!artha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and rll1eir Chi ldren, 26 
Conn. L Rev. 817,83 1-38 (1994) (arguing that "the welfare reforms of the past fiYe yeai"S 
are not reforms but instead reiterations of longstand in g lines of social cleavage" that are 
unlikely to help women). Id. at 819. See al so Diana Pearce, Welfare Is [·Jot for 'WomeD: 
Why the Wa r on Poverty Cannot Conquer the Feminization of Poverty, in 'Nomen, the 
State, and We lfare. supra note 8, at 265, 267-69 (describing the uniqu;:ness of fema le 
povert y) . 
28 Hand ler. supra note 9, at 864. 
29 Id. at 861; Gwendol yn l'v1ink, Welfare Reform in Historica l Perspecti v·~. 26 Conn . L. 
Rev. 879, 882 ( 1994) . See also Kathryn Ed in & Chrisopher Jencks , Refo rming Welfare. in 
Jencks, supra note 4, at 204,205 -11 (describing how poor mothe rs in Illinois com bine work 
and welfare in order to survive); Kathryn Edin, Surviving the Welfare System: How AFDC 
Recipients Make Ends Mee t in Chicago, 38 Soc. Probs. 462 (1991) (ssme) . 
30 Pearce . sup ra note 27, at 269. 
31 See Je ncks, supra note 4, at 223 -26; Fennell, supra note 12 , a t 281. .4s an officer in a 
Ca liforni a work program expl ained: "[A] single woman with three child r':';n, who hs.s w pa.y 
fo r chi lcl care. can't live off S6 an hour. That is an economic reality that goe:; beyon d t:1 e 
welfare cyc le we want to break ." Sa ra R imer, Jobs Program Participants: Still '?oor and in 
Need of Aid. N .Y. T imes, Apr. 10, 1995, at AL B 10. 
32 ~o r example. conservati ves in Congress fa iled to fu nd welfarr~ v.;or!z program 
provisions fo r job trai ning, subsid ized child care , hea lth care , and job creation. See infra 
notes 75- 76 and accompanying text. 
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.c:. Ty ir1g E;ttirle.rt?etzts to P..ifarriage 
According to the conservative vision, single motherhood 1s especially 
~mmoral and harmful, in part becaus:; conservatives see poverty as result-
from out--of-wedlock child birtcL'3 Although families headed by sin-
'-' . 
:::i -~ f2m~"tles 2.re d is·proportio r.\<?.t:::~':. · :~·: :_:,or~~ ~~ ~~Jan fa~~ui 1 ies vvith an. ?t~.l 1.1lt 
, :;;. r ·,·-· . .=. .::-.-=--··. ·: ; :J .. ~ - .. ~ .--'- ...... , ... - -· . ) 
._· cus ~s poverty or that marnagc 01 p <~ tc:mal ciuid suppon will ens u:c~ dlii -
- • .1""• • - (' ...., 5 . ..., ' ~ .. , ~ . ~ "' ' . 
'~;~:·en ·s nnanoal weJrare . .) tZ?c[ii ;;:~·. c~L lei:ren s poverty results rrom lnade-
qua'ce fami ly income, due to th <:; declining ability of one parent to earn 
~- .,rl'oh .c r. :ot~r nb v the> " ·ti· 1i·oc. 36 T:l· rn-r- hlprn ." "". 8 " b t"'d. ' .,. . _, . _  ._,o.t.. lu cLG.y :::t o .e 1·.~ pov. __ r _I '--"' " .. l.lS e- <J ,Jl ~ . .. i b vX ._C,~T · a.v \ Dy 
·,c,-mki ng conditions that make it -.,·irtua1lv imnossible for mothers to com-
bine low-wage jobs with child ra ising .37 , " 
Ti.'1e causal connection claimed by conservatives be tween welfare and 
unwed motherhood may be challenged on similar grounds: no evidence 
exists that ·welfare is an incentive for women to create single-mother 
33 The Personal Responsibility Act introduced in the newly conservative House decla-res 
that ·'marriage is the foundation of a successful society" and "an essential social institution 
,,¥hich promotes the interests of children and society a t large." A list of "the negative 
consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth on the child, the mother, and society ... " follows. 
Pe rsonal Responsibility Act, supra note 26, at§ 100. The Act prohibits mothers under the 
age of 18 from rece iving AFDC benefi ts for any ch ild born out of wedlock, regardless of 
when aid is sought for the child, unless the mother marries the child 's fa ther or someone 
w!1o adopts the child. Id . at § 105(a)(3) . An amendment to the House bill would a llow 
teenage mothers to receive Medicc.id, food stamps, and vouchers to pay for items "suitable 
fo r the care of the child. " Mireya Navarro, The Threa t of No Benefits: Will I t Deter 
Pregnancies?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1995. at A l. 
34 Audrey Rowe, The Feminization of Poverty: A n Issue for the 90's , 4 Yale J. L & 
Feminism 73, 74 (1991 ). See also Donald J. Hernandez, America's Children: Resources 
from Family, Government and the Economy 284 tbl. 8.2 (1993) (stating that in 1988, 34.9% 
nf poor ch ildren lived wi th 2 parents, while 57.1 cyo lived with mother only); Bureau of the 
Census, U.S. Dep't of Com., Statistica l Abs tract of the Uni ted States 1993, at 470 tb l. 737 
(llc!.th ed. 1993) (stating that the 1991 poverty rate was 12.1% among married couple 
househo lds with children, compared to 59.0% in single-mother house holds). 
35 Even researchers who find some causal connection between child poverty and family 
str i..:cture attribu te only 10 to 20 percem of poverty to the ri se of female-headed 
ho useholds. See , e.g., Hernandez. supra not'~ 34, at 290, 325; Mary Jo Bane , Household 
C;;-nposition and Poverty: Which Comes Firs t? '' in Fighting Poverty: What "Works and 
\V hat Doesn ' t 209, 321 (Sheldon H. Danzig,:r & Daniel H . Weinberg eds ., 1986) . 
J6 cilarsha Garrison, Chi ld Suppor t and Ch ildren' s Pove rty, 28 Fam. LQ. 475, 496 -98 
(reviewing J\ndrea H. Be ller & John V/ . Graham, Small Change : 1lJe E con omics of 
Ch ild Support (1993) and Donald J. He m:mde z, America's Children: Resources fro m 
:?arniiy, Government and the Economy (1993)) . 
37 See supra note 31 and accompanying k :;t. 
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households?8 True, 1-\FDC gives some women who might otherwise be 
fo rced to depend on a man's income the financia l abil ity to establish their 
own households.39 The judgment that this type of independence is bad, 
.however, is not based on evidence tha t welfar-:: causes poverty. Rather, 
- . · r · , · · .., · , c . , . tt11s 1s a nor~~-Ec~:~rve aec1S10n --yv rncn pre1ers encouragrrrg \Vornen s econorn1c 
child care directly to 
.. : : .:. __ -_  -~·-.::. ;:. _  ·/i:Cg :}\ 1-JTl :!::::_C!. Jj ~) ~.--· t:_ ::;:C:')rL·~>C 'l 
·tic:<n V\.,-iti.l stste st~bsiGles . - ~ 0 
It is .:; spesially 1Jnlikely that marriage c;r child support will eradicate the 
poverty oi: m os·t black children. Research suggests that there are racial 
diffe :ren.ses in paths to poverty fe r vvomen. Vvhe r ,as many whi te women 
are lefl irnpoverished by divorce , black single mothe rs are more li kely to 
be the victims of "reshuffled pove rty," caused by the dissolution of a poor 
two-parent household.41 
Even if marriage would improve poor mothers' financial well-being, 
this result would not justify affi rmatively linking their economic options 
to marriage . But this is precisely the effec t of " bridefare" programs that 
give mothers monetary rewards for marrying. The New Jersey Family 
Development Act , for example, allows families to earn income up to one 
hundred fifty percent of the poverty line income and still keep their 
AFDC benefits, Medicaid, and emergency housing assistance if, and only 
if, the m other marries.42 The law, however, denies this benefit to an 
unmarried woman who lives with the working father of her children , to a 
working mother who does not have a husband, and to two mothers who 
decide to pool their resources to support their children in a single house-
hold. Measures like the one in New Jersey do not tie welfare to m arriage 
in order to end children's poverty; they tie welfare to m arriage in order to 
champion the nuclear family and the reby penal ize single, independent 
mothers. 
3S See S'-lpra note 8 and accompan ying text. Efforts to d isco urage single m o therhood by 
cutt ing welfare benefits have fai led , with the proportion of fam ilies headed by unmarried 
women ris ing even with benefits fall ing. Jencks, supra no te 4, at 227. 
39 Edelrnsn , supr2 note 9, a t 72; Fenne ll , supra no te 12, a t 29 1. 
40 See ?'!Iartha L A . Fineman, Mask ing Dependen cy: The Po li tical Role of Famil y 
Rhetoric, 81 Va . L. Rev. 2181 (1995) . 
41 Bane, st>pra note 35 , a t 227-28, 231 tbl. 9.6 (i nd ica ting that 22% of poor black and 
49% of poor wh ite single mothe rs became poo r at the tim e they established a single -
mothe: household); G reg J. Duncan & Willard Rodgers, Longitud in al Aspects of 
C hildren ·s ?o·.'er!y, 50 J. Marriage & Fam . 1007 , 101 2 (1988) ("Fam il y structu re pa tterns 
are m ore pv,verful determ inan ts cf th '.! econornic fat es of white tha n black children ."). 
42 See i'·!ina Pe rales, A "Tangle of Pa thology" : Racia l Myth a nd the New Je rsey Famil y 
Develop;:-m:nt />.c t in Mot hers in Law: Feminis t 1lteory and the Legal Regul at io n of 
lviotherhood 250 (lvianha A. Fineman & Isabe lle Karpin cds., 1995). 
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II. SuPPO RTING CHILDREN THROUGH SOC l r\L SECUR ITY 
Sugarman proposes a p lan that has potential appeal fo r both conserva-
tives and libe rals; his proposal provides child support assurance ihrough 
the more favored Social Security system. R ather than abolish che stratiil.-
cat io n of \\'e lfare. Sugarrnan's s t r~""tte gy is to exploit it. Ir.: effect . 
~ ~..~ b c~lt cons,_:-;-\·d it~.:cs at their O\\ r: ga1r1e . .SugilL~i l~·:.:·l · ~: prupo:~: <.:~ 
·- -; :~ r; -:~= 
pii::;hcs this goal by moving oue group of rnothc1s i1om the dislc; Yv< ,:; :.~ 
wc lfar<.: rolls to the privileged Socia l Security category . In so c1cing, ti~ ; ; 
proposa l takes advantage ot the powerfui appeal offered by two po pular 
:nocle ls ot social provision: the insurance model that views public 8ssist-
a nce as an exercise of self-insurance,43 and the child support model th~t 
re lies on fathers' wages to provide for children's economic well-being. 4 4 
By building on these models, Sugarman's plan ingeniously expands wel·· 
fare payments to children while maintaining key aspects of the conserva-
tive vision. It preserves the distinction between Social Security and 
wel fare and the linking of mothers' economic security to men, preferably 
husbands. More fundamentally, Sugarman's plan to tie child support to 
Social Security adopts the conservative rejection of collective responsibil-
ity to children, appealing instead to fathers' private interests in ensuring 
the security of their own children. 
This plan may have the advantage of blurring the distinction between 
welfare and social insurance by moving more children into the latter cate-
gory. As Sugarman realizes, however, conservatives will find any child 
support assurance scheme unacceptable if it benefits all single mothers . 
There fore , Sugarman's proposal narrows the group of eligible mothers to 
those who can claim a man's Social Security account. As Sugarman 
acknowledges, this criterion will almost certainly foreclose teenage 
mothers from participating in the program since it is unlikely that the 
fathers of their children will have worked long enough to qualify for the 
43 Others have noted the political attractiveness of using th e Social Security mode l for 
o the r we lfare: programs. See, e.g., Charles Lockhart , Gaining Gro un d: Ta iloring Social 
Programs to Ame rican Values 4 (J 989) (proposing that the "design fea tures of social 
securit y cou ld be adapted for the development of social merging programs directed a t 
reduc ing pove rty") . Both John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin advance theories of justice 
tha t re ly on a model of self-insurance. Fenne ll, supra note 12, at 272-73 & n.l-1-2 (referring 
to John Raw ls, A Theory of Justice (1971) and Ronald Dworkin. V/hat is E quality'? Part 2: 
E qual ity of Resources, 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 283, 315 (1981)) . 
.!.J See Gordon, supra note 21 , at 37-64 (describing how Progress ive Era welfare 
refom1ers relied on the norm of the fam ily wage); Garrison, supra note 36, at 476 (" Over 
the las t twenty years, liberal and conservat ive policymakers alike have increasingly seen in 
ch ild support a key method of reducing ch ildren's poverty and we lf<~re depe ndence .") . 
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program. 4 5 On the o ther hand, women who were once married to the 
fa thers of their children are give n privileged sta tus unde r the Sugarman 
plan: they receive care taker as well as childre n's benefits, eve n though 
Sugarman concedes that such discrimina tion rs " unfai r " and 
Hillogica lt~ ] . ·P~~6 
r - · ~ : ) \ · ·t r;.z ?. lot of childre n into t h ~~ Social Sec uri ty c::1.tegnry i~~ 
\YO:t t:h :.)i.~2 <t!u~ a n · s con~:\-;ss ions ro con sc c\·dti \.·c.:) . Atre r alL tcc.; !'ia~,~ 
mothers cc·m p.rised only five pe rcent of we lfare re cipients in 1SI91 ~-n 
M oreo·;cr, rnost :)f the child ren who would be el igible for Socia l Security 
benefit s unde r the Sugarman plan would receive larger benefits than they 
c1..:rren tly do ~nde r AFDC; addit ionally, m others could supplemen t the 
beneflt s with earnings a nd child support. Nevertheless, Sugarman's pro -
posa l excludes not only the child ren of teenage mo thers, but also all chil-
dren whose fathers did no t work long enough to be insured fo r Socia l 
Security purposes . Furthermore, some never-married mo thers would be 
unable to claim benefi ts because of complications in proving pate rnity, 
while many m ore mothers would receive inadequate be nefits. A lthough 
it is re lat ively easy for a worke r to earn enough to be eligible for Social 
Security benefits, the children of fathers who have worked at low wage 
jobs, on ly sporadically o r over a short period of time, would be entitled to 
only minimal benefits .48 Indeed, some of the children cove red by 
Sugarman 's program would receive benefits that are substantially lower 
than what they currently receive under AFDC.49 
45 Sugam1an, supra note 2, a t 2562 & n.109. Thus , Suga rma n's scheme has th e same 
effect as does the Personal Res ponsibility Act 's denial of AFDC to unwed mothe rs unde r 
the age of 18. See Persona l Responsibility Act , supra note 26, § 105. 
46 Suga rma n, sup ra no te 2, a t 2564. 
-l7 i\iiink , supra note 29, at 895. 
48 Because e ligibil ity is tied to an ind ividual's la bor market history and a ttachmen t, 
Socia! Security ·'favo rs individuals who have a long, continuo us, and fu ll- ti me wo rk 
hi story ." Karl E. I<lare, Toward New Stra tegies For Low-Wage Workers, 1 P ub. Interes t 
LT. 1, 17 (1995). See generall y Kingson & Berkowitz, supra note 21, a t 57-59 (describing 
Social Security eligib ility requ irements) . 
~9 Telephone in terview wi th J ill Q uadagno, Author, The Color of We lfare (1995) (Ma r. 
15 , 1995). For example , the surviving ch ild of a deceased fathe r who begins to work at age 
22, vmrks consistent ly for the fed eral m inimum wage ($4.25), and d ies in 1993 at age 40, 
v:ou!d rece ive a mont hl y Social Security benefit of $390.00. The ch ild' s moth er would 
rece ive no ca re taker benefit if she had no t married the father. See House Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 103rd Cong. , 2d Sess ., 1994 Green Book: Background Mater ial and Da ta on 
Programs Within the Jurisdi ction of th e Committee on Ways and Mea ns 37 tbl. 1-17 (1 994) 
[he reinafte r 1994 Green Book]. On the o ther ha nd, a two-pe rson fa m ily, composed of 
ca retaker and chiid, rece ived in January 1994 a max im um AFD C bene fi t of S549.00 in 
Connecticut and $468.00 in Ne w York City. Id. at 368-69 tbl. 10-12. 
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The limited success of efforts to collect child support provides further 
e vidence that the benefi ts will probably be inadequate for many childr<:n 
under Sugarman's scheme. A lthough Sugarman has devised a novel 'Nay 
of collecting support from fathers, the idea of turning to child support .as 
a method of reduci ng chilclrcr: 's poverty and we lfare depende nc::: is not 
new.50 Since 1975 Congr.,;~; : ~<:; er1 acted i:r:creasingly ton?"': .:.:=::::~ .'.r .=::s 
d' c:. ; ·• ;:::·d· -- ~ · ~r, · ; - -- , . _,l ;· )' •· ~ ,- ··:·:;-- · ,· .. ··: ,'i .'). , - ~~; ·,,· , ~-.. :~ :·i d s·11-; -.~ 1 ,--,. T:· :) l '' /:-. ·. <·...:.:. .~ · . .. CS1 g 11v l l) I eCv U ~ \Y\,... d . ct. 1C '-''J~)• .• ) v . ....,itv .... • . .Ld _:-~ •_.,_, Jl -....... '..!fJ _t--·G.:. !... . ~..- .... __ __ , .._.,.. ___ ,.._, _L 
ned stat e and feder al campaig ns 'O ;.rnprove chii.d support colJ r.:; c ~ ic n. (l?i··i f: 
fa iled either to lower the povert y rate for children or to reduce sigrnf'.-
cantly the number of children on \Velfare .52 Tne Department of F{e s lth 
and H uman Services projects th2! higher child supJYJrt payrn. ';': r:ts ·.:vot1ld 
enable less than ten perce nt of families on welfare to rise above the pov· 
e rty levet53 Thus , while the state should vigorously assist mothers who 
seek child support from fath ers with decent incomes, we cannot rely on 
child support to end child poverty. 
The children who would be excluded from Sugarman's m odel or who 
would receive reduced benefits under his plan are disproportionately 
black; meanwhile , the child re n who would benefit most are dispropor-
tionately white. This is because whi te mothers are more likely to become 
poor as a result of separation from the fa ther, and white fa thers are m ore 
likely to earn the wages necessary to ensure adequate child assurance 
benefits.54 In addition , the marriage requirement Sugarman proposes for 
50 See Garrison , supra note 36, at 476-79. For another child support ass urance scheme, 
see Irwin Garfin ke l, Assuring Chi ld Supp ort (1992) . 
51 Garrison , supra note 36, a t 476. The Pe rsonal Responsibility Act reduces or de ni es 
AFDC benefits for a ch ile! whose pa terni ty has not been es tabiished . See Personal 
Respons ibility Act , supra not e 26. a t § 101. 
52 Ga rrison , supra no te 36, a t 489, 502 (obse rving that '· [n]o chi ld support policy can 
ra ise the income of a child support obligor, nor can it recreate the economies of scale 
ava ilable to an intact ho useho ld"). See ge nera ll y Andrea H. Bel le r & Jo hn '0/. Gra ham, 
Small Change: The Economics of Child Sup port (1 993) (analyzing the resu lts of chil d 
support legisla ti o n). 
53 B renner, supra note 26, a t 123 . 
54 See supra note 41 and accompa nying te xt; Andrew Hacker, Two I··laticns: Bl ;;_d; , 
White , Separate, H ostile, Unequal 94 (1992). For similar re asons, policies th z•t replace 
we lfa re with chil d support collection tend to benefit wh ite children and disadvantage 'o iack 
children. See Irwin GarimkcL Dan ie l R l'>/lcye r & Gary D . Sandefur, The Effects of 
A lterna tive C hil d Support Sys tems on Blacks , Hispan ics, and Non-Hispanic ·whi tes, 66 
Soc. Serv. Re v. 505, 5 !8 tbL 3 (1 992) (ca lcula ting tha t un der Wisconsin's percent<>.ge of 
income child support fonnu la, whi te families obtained a $431 mill ion annual gain •Nhereas 
b lack and H ispanic fam ilies suffered more than a $200 mill ion loss) . 
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caretaker benefits would disqualify most black mothers in the program 
since most black children are bom to rr.\others who never married.55 
Sugarman's response to the exclusion of these child ren from his plan is 
to propose that their fathers be requi red to work. V./ork programs 
directed at fat hers have a better chance of ::;uccess than those directed <H 
sl ngle rno tb!~ :cs~ tle.cJLJ.SC rn:.:n en\:e.r c -~~-l CJ ~ c --~'~::_ ~v· cratjle job marJ:~ c t ar.t(J ttSi) ~· 
a1ly C'::t t.: Lt=:::-t :rin:Jcreci ·L :~: !~L_~ ~,~l CCL :.· -:; ~ - -:.:: ~~.f..!·.) ... ~_:.- : _ ;_~ ~~-~2-~;S i ~-l t!.iSil e f~-CiJ:"t ·L·..J 
and to keep a j ob:~c~ Despite 1hese (e l~1£l\'~ ::;_ cvc~ntctge~~ flO'ivever, .. ·.Dear-
ing down'' on ch ronically unemployed Ltfv: rs · i not produce the jobs or 
income needed to lift their childre n ou t o l: poveny.57 SugaEnan's propo-
sal also subjects the excl uded mothers to rnc,rc:: intense government super· 
vision than those who are lucky enough to ql1.alify for the nevv Soci,sl 
Security benefi ts; the assumption here seems to be that the latter group 's 
connection to wealthier men improves their ability to parent. 
III. T H E HrsTOR Y OF SAcRIFICE o F BLACK CHILD REN ' s INTERESTS 
R ecent historical accounts of America 's welfare system demonstrate 
that its stinginess in providing benefit s to the poor stems not from noble 
conservative or liberal ideals, but from racist unwillingness to include 
blacks as full citizens and from reliance on the patriarchal norm of the 
male breadwinner. 58 This history suggests that the very exclusion of poor 
black children and increased government supervision of their parents will 
help to garner support for Sugarman's proposal. Indeed, I suspect that 
the main appeal of a child assurance program to many white fathers is 
that it would force them to support their own children , rather than others 
who are black .59 Sugarman, too, acknowledges the racial undercurrent of 
55 Since 1984, ove r ha lf of a ll black fami lies with child ren have been headed by women 
who neve r marr ied. Margaret C. Simms, Black Women Who Head Families: An Economic 
Struggle , in Slipping Through the Cracks : The Status of Black Women 141 , 142 (Margaret 
C. Simms & Juli anne Malveaux eds. , 1986) . 
56 See Pea rce, supra note 27, at 267-69 (d iscuss ing differences in ma le and fem ale 
pove rt y); Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equa lity for Women: La bor Ma rke t Hostility to 
Wo rking Mothers, 59 B. U.L. Eev. 55 (1979) (desCi ibing how the work-famil y conflic t is 
particularly damaging to women) . 
57 See Jencks, supra note 4, at 122-30 (1992) (d iscussing rates of and reasons for blac:, 
male job lessness) . See genera lly William Julius \Vilson, The Truly D isadvantaged (1987) 
(discussing the dramatic increase in black male poverty betw•::en the 1960s and 1980s) . 
5~ See, e.g. , Gordon, supra note 21 (argui11g that Southern congressmen specificall y 
excluded blacks from Socia! Se·~ur it y programs to l~·~ ep them in low-paying, men ia l jobs); 
J ill Q uadagno , The Color of \i\fclfare : Hmv :Racism Undenn ined the 'Nar on Poverty (1994) 
(noting tha t Social Security acts we re c;-eated as a i·ac ia!ly segregated sys tem ). 
5tJ Cf. Derr ick Be ll , And '.11./e 1-\re l'Jo ~ Saved: ·r he E lusive Q uest for P:.ac!al.Justice (1987) 
(concl uding that white Americans are not \vitling to undert ake the socia l transformati on 
needed to achie ve rac ial justice); Dc:othy c. Roberts , Tne Gene tic Tie, 62 U. Chi . L. Rev. 
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debates about welfare policy , noting that liberals remain wary that 
attacks on the poor are disguised attacks on racia l and other minorities.60 
It seems, however, that liberals' unease about racial discrimination has 
not deterred them from sacrificing the imerests of black children in order 
to make political bargains with conservatives. 
J-: .. 1~1erica 's ·.,~/elfare system origins~ecl_ in the Proares::;ive Era, the result 
of feminist reformers' concern for cl io:: pjjg_ht of ooor single mothers, cou-
~ '---' ,_ '--" 
pled \Vi th the ir misguided faith in mothers' economic dependence on 
their husbands ' "family wage. " 61 H:e mate rnal ist welfare legislation the y 
::; :~ cured \vas intended for white widows only: government workers distrib-
uted benefits according to standards that effec tive ly excluded black 
mothers .62 The New Deal expanded upon this system, installing the strat-
ified and unequal provision of public assistance through Social Security 
and Aid to D ependent Children.63 Whereas Social Security recipients 
-were entitled to their benefits, welfare recipients were subjected to a 
regii11e of means-testing, morals-testing, home visits and low payments.64 
Social Security also incorporated the Progressives' reliance on male-
earned wages to meet the needs of families. Northern and Southern 
Democrats struck a deal that systematically denied blacks eligibility for 
Social Security benefits,65 omitting fe deral eligibility standards and 
excluding agricultural workers and domestic servants in a deliberate 
effort to maintain a black menial labor caste in the South.66 Even Aid to 
Dependent Children was created for white mothers, who were not 
expected to work.67 
The 1960s War on Poverty was an effort, propelled by the Civil Rights 
Movement, to e liminate the racial barriers of New Deal programs and to 
209, 257-69 (1995) (discussing how race shapes the legal and socia l relationship between 
parents and children). 
6il Sugarman, supra note 2, at 2571-72. 
' 1 G ordon, supra note 21, at 37-64, 145-81, 289-91. 
62 Gordon, supra note 21, at 48 (noting that only three percent of beneficiaries of 
mothers' pensions were black); Handler & H asenfe ld , supra note 22, at 65-70. 
63 See Gordon, supra note 21, a t 253-85 (discussing the legisla tive progression of social 
insu rance programs). 
64 See Gordon, supra note 21 , at 253-54 (comparing Social Security's " re lat ive ly 
generous and honorable" terms wizh ADC's '' stingy and humiliating condi tions"); Mink, 
supra note 29, at 880 (describing barriers to A.DC eligibility). 
65 Gordon , supra note 21, at 276; Q uadagno, supra note 58, at 20-24. 
66 Gordo n, supra note 21, at 275-76; Q uadagno, supra note 58, at 20-24. Similarly, 
Southern white politicians helped to defeat the Family Assistance Plan in 1972, arguing, in 
the vvorcls of one Congressman, tha t with the Plan " [t]here's not going to be anybody le ft 
to ro ll these whee lbarrows and press these shirts ." Quadagno, supra note 58, at 130. 
67 Ab;·amovitz, supra note 8, at 318-19. 
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integrate blacks into the national political economy. 68 It forced states for 
1-, " • ] h Jc ,. 'hT . 1 h ' tue nrst t1me to re_ax t e 'Ne .. rare e_u.gl v l~l tj requirements t11at .LaO 
excluded blacks. The National Welfare Rights Organization, a grassroots 
movement composed of welfare mothers, secu!ed rights to benefits, 
r aised bene fi ts levels , and increased availabili tv o f benefits to familie s 
.he aded by ·\:r1orn.en.69 1-\.s c. result, ~~ ~JY 1967, (~. \_,~--=:·_; caJe load th a t had 
once been ;:; ighty-six perce l}t \vhir.e hud 
nonwhite. " 7u 
The ·war on Po·verty programs' li nk to bl8r:ks' civil rights, however, is 
precisely what doomed them: whites opposed these programs as an 
infringement on their economic right to discriminate against blacks and a 
threat to their political supremacy.71 As a res1J lt, many of the V/ar on 
Poverty programs were dismantled altogether.72 Meanwhile, as AFDC 
became increasingly associated with black mothers , it became increas-
ingly burdened with behavior modification, 'Nork requirements and 
reduced effective benefit levels.73 The public association of welfare with 
black single mothers converged with already-existing stereotypes about 
black people's laziness, fecundity and irresponsibility?4 
More recently, the so-called consensus between liberals and conserva-
tives on work programs turned out to be a "Faustian bargain":75 conserv-
atives were able to legislate work requirements and time limits, but failed 
to fund liberal provisions for job training, subsidized child care, health 
care, job creation and other essential services.76 Work requirement pro-
grams like this one, terminating benefits afte r two years , also dispropor-
68 Q uadagno, supra note 58, at 30-31 ; Pearce, supra note 27, a t 274-75. 
69 See Amott, supra note 8, at 288. See also Brenne1, supra note 26, at 113 (discussing 
NWRO wel fare reform efforts). 
70 Mink, supra note 29, at 891. 
7l Q uadagno, supra note 58, passim. 
72 Id. at 175-78. 
73 See Min k, supra note 29, at 880-81. 
7-l See id. at 891-92. See also Wahneema Lu biano, Black Ladies , Welfare Q ueens , and 
State Minst re ls: Ideological War by Narrat ive ]';leans, in Race-ing Jus t ice, E n-Gendering 
Power: Essays on A nita H ill, Clarence Thomas , and the Cons tructi on of Socia l R eali ty 323 , 
332 (Toni Morrison ed. , 1992) (discussing the " welfa re q ueen" and black wom en as we lfare 
icons). 
75 M inow, supra note 27 , at 824 n .40 (quoting La urence E . Lynn, Jr., Ending \Velfare 
Reform as We Know It, Am. Prospect 83, 90 (Fa li 1993) ). 
76 See Famil y Support Act of 1988, P ub. L. No . i00-435, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U .S.C.) . See a iso Joe l F . Hand ier & Ye heskel 
I-l.asen fe ld , The Moral Construction of Poverty: Welfare Reform in Am erica 210, 215, 231 
(1 991) (discuss ing the fa ilure of the A ct' s JOBS program). 
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tionately disadvantage blacks, who are fa r less likely than whites to 
escaoe the need for welf8.re \Vithin a short oeriod of time. 77 
1 1 
IV. A LTERNATIVE S TR ATEG IES FOR CoA LITION Bu iLD ING 
a.dorJting ~ r : ~:I i onz_L~ :: !.J(: ~ ._;_ --. - ,_~ Li \ -.. ~ policies That SC!crit1c~ th-:; 1:: __ : !>:~ :·-~-- ~ --· ::=)~~ ·c.Lc 
nee~Jiest children . 'vV-h;Jt \\iOUlcl an agenda that refused to CVii rcJnllse 
with conservatives loo c:. like':' It would abolish the si:ratific8.tion 0~1sed on 
notions of ·\;arned' ' entit iemems and '·undeserved" handouts. lt wou ld 
p lace indi vid ual wel fare programs in the larger context of the e ntire wel -
fare state and its role in fos tering citizenship . It would rely on a collective 
obligation to poor families, rather than on fathers' private interest in their 
own children. And it would provide public financial assistance as part of 
a broader program to rest ructure economic, social and political institu-
tions to make them more egalitarian, democratic and just. 
The last few times I wrote about American welfare policy, I ended on a 
pessimistic note; I expressed doubt that the majority of white Americans 
would treasure poor black children enough to seek to bring them into full 
membership in the national community, and I wondered how an 
expanded welfare state would compensate white Americans for their loss 
of racial privilege.78 Still, it would be possible to achieve the agenda I just 
mentioned by building political coalitions among those who share a com-
mon interest in implementing an inclusive and redistributive program. 
Liberal and progressive welfare reformers have suggested a n umber of 
strategies for this sort of coalition building. Some advocate programs 
that base eligibility on universal criteria as a way of eliminating we lfare's 
stratified structure and building broad-based support.79 Mary Jo Bane 
and David T. Ellwood, fo r example, recently proposed replacing a wel-
fare system that meets ail of the needs of one stigmatized group with an 
array of programs that would serve a broader population, including bene-
fits such as universal heal th insurance , m andatory child support and 
77 1994 Green Book, supra note 49, at 446 tbl. 10-46 (between 1980 and 1989, 19.8% of 
nonwhite persons lived in households rece iving AFDC benefits for three to ten years, 
compared to on ly three and a half percent of white persons living in such househoids) . 
78 See Dorothy E . Roberts, The Value of Black /1;1others' Work, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 87 1, 
878 (1994) ; Dorothy E. Roberts, 'vVe lfare Yesterday and Today, 24 Con temp . Soc. 1, 3 
(1995) (reviewing Linda Gordon . P itied Bu t No t Entitled: Single Mothers and the History 
of Welfare (1994) and Ji ll Q uadagno. The Color of Welfa re : H ow Racism U nde rmi ned the 
War on Poverty (1994)). 
79 See, e.g. , G ordon, supra note 21, at 305; Robert Kuttne r, Tne Economi c Ii!u~icn : False 
Choices Be twee n Prosperity and Social Justice 40 (1 984); Lockhart, supra note 43, at 2; 
Wi lson, supra note 57, at 154-55. 
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earned mcome ~ax credits to subsidize low-wage jobso80 A .more expan-· 
sive trniversal p1:og:r2rn rn_ight cJso incl11de governrn.ent s:Jbsi c1 i -~: for clr.:y 
d ~ ' . .-
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> .,, j ' 0 h 0 • care, tecent noi.lsrng, IZI.Tfruy 8lJ. O\Nances anr a nrg~1er rn.trllii1tlDJ \Vage. 
~these univers.al :prograrrls could be part of an aggressi·ve jobs policy 7 
advanced ~JY 2 ·::oa h.tio:G of ·pc~c .:.~ fJe ople 's advot:(rtcs 2.I1d o:cganiz·:; (~ l c:: ~:;or .. 
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. ~L,t; i,:::tJ~-~~::\ ~o:~~:7r., .. __ , -~1:;.'!;~/e~~,:l pr~j~r:,rn~.=lon~ ::,~. ;~ir::,~:=J~ -,~ ' .. 
l f.;..J tl!wl .!. O.i.. ! d. .dLvG T8. :,.- J.. .J.:...ll. c::.n :. .:; :.::c .~~1..J .t.i1 :....~1a.t pc;1p ...... lUcu.c pOic .t ~.. ~,. .:1. .t~·:.. c u J. Lf 
civil right:; ri!.cvernent illtJ.strates 'the potential of blacl( resistar1ce \.Vher1 
Lt:ni tcd -.;;i tl1 otl-1 er ~~~::os::essi,v e pc :::; iJles ' r.noverr1tr1ts for t~~a.r~sfe: ;~:.-.:l:T.~ts irls~j ·· 
• , ,.,. <r7 · ·r · h83 th 1 · ........, 1 \'f "' ,. .,--,. tutwna, s[ITlCtures, .lrl 1-,..eepzng razt , eo1ogEm LOn1el -!''est on ers Ur. 
lVlartin Luther King, Jr.'s organizing strategies during the first stage of the 
civii rights movement as an example of a successfu l progressive coalition 
1-. , '"' • 0 " .I rl d l , Sd t~.,at crossed uounGa:nes 01: c .ass arL, race to a vocate structur?. cnangeo · 
'-Nest observes that King VI% able to consolidate the most pmverfui pro-
. ~ "1 1 1 . . h ' 1 • s h . ' 0 gress1ve wcces ava1 ao1e m L1e o,acK out 1ern corrnn umty at tnat tune: 
" the cultural potency of prophetic black ch11rches, the skills of engaged 
black preachers, trade-unionists and professionals, and the spirit of rebel-
lion and resistance of the black working poor and underclasso"85 The 
b lack freedom movement eli.o:11inated the most blatant forms of white 
repression in the South, including the use of terror as a mode of social 
ao David T Ellwood , Reducing Poverty by Replacing We lfare, in l\11ary Jo Bane & 
David T. E llwood, We lfare :Realiti es : From R hetoric to Reform 143, 148 (1994). 
Christopher Je !1cks similarly proposes a program of government assis tance to 11 1l parents 
with low-wage jobs, including increasing the Earned Income Tax Credit , granting tax 
credits for child care and housing expenses, and providing universa l health insurance. 
Jencks, supra note 4, a t 233 -34. Sugarman 's child support assurance plan might fit this 
model, but its criteria for eligibili ty are not sufficient ly inclusive. A lthough tying child 
assurance to Social Security migh t unite mid dle-class and working-class women with poor 
mothe rs who all rece ive benei1ts fmrn the same program, see Sugarman, S'.lpra note 2, at 
2568, it wo uld further marginalize the poor m othe rs who do not qualify. It m ight a.lso 
deepen the racial d ivide between " deserving" and " undeserving" welfa re i·ecipien ts since 
the children excluded frorn tne orogram will be disproportionate ly b!ad~ . 
81 See 1(1are, supra note a t 6 -12. See also I-landler, supra note 9, at 868 (not ing that 
refonns such as universal healtl! ccr::e 2- nd the E arned Incorne Tax 'Ctedit '' b lur the 
distinct ion be t\Neen the si ngle p3. ttr~t farn ily rnoving off vvelfare, o r cor11bining \velfare and 
82 See Q ua-dagno , supra note 58, at 156. See a lso Robert Greenstein , Univr;rsc:i and 
Targeted J\.pproaches to Relie ving Pove rty: .A.n P .. lternative V1e'.v, iY! ~fh e IJrban 
1J nderclass 437, 455 -58 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E . Pete rson eds ., 1991) (d i:;cussing the 
nr: ed to cornbine univ;~rsc.1 2lr;. c! (2,tgeted c.pproaches) . 
83 ·Corne! -~-v'e5t ~ I(eeping ;~ai th : Fhilo::;ophy and F.ace in .t\.rnerica (1993) . 
8-1 Irio at 271, 272-73. 
35 id . 8.t 273. 
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control , and won federal cornmitment to black civi l and voting rights, 
although it failed to sustain the mom.,-;:-nt'XiTl necessa<:y to transform power 
relationships in America. 
Tl r 1 • j- cc 1 1 • c __ 1e conunon concerns or wonnng mouers one:: anot>1er oas1s ror pro-
gressive coalition buiicling. Lucie \ V:h.it·e calls on <n\ cl. dle -class and elite 
charnpioned (i-:l~:: ti~ -~ L p;-:~)_5~ · z,!'~ "l:J :.J{ -~ :~:. Oli~; :)~JCi1~J:;1g _t :~-~- ~uo.c single rr~others 
and their children. ~),:, (~onternpora:ry \vomen, ~/V hite suggests, could 
replace the Progressives' ~'ccus on "pensions to prc,tect poor women from 
the workforce" with "reforms for all van::nts in the workolace itself."87 
1 > 
:M:idd le-class, woT!<:ing class, a:1d jobless poor mothers share an interest in 
transforming the gend.ered division of labor tha't assigns unpaid caretak-
ing tasks to women without public support and structures the wo~kplace 
around men's needs. Other feminist reformers have emphasized the uni-
fying theme that mothers ' labor in the home as well as in the market 
should be valued and compensated.88 
Of course, such alliances 'Will be difficult to forge. These groups will 
have to make politica l compromises among themselves to resolve con-
flicting interests, strategies, and uotions of justice , just as liberals and con-
servatives have bargained over welfare policy. 111e allure of white 
privilege continues to pose a forrnidable obstacle to radical reform. Ye t I 
place far more hope in the possibility of forming progressive coalitions to 
achieve economic, racial and gender justice than I would in any welfare 
"consensus" reached between liberals and conservatives. 
sc. See Lucie E . White, On the ·'Consensus" To E nd Welfare: INhere Are the Women's 
Voices?, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 843, 846 (1994) . 
87 Id. at 853. See also Bren ner, supra note 26, at 127-28 (proposing all iances between 
groups of women based on a poli tics that emphas izes combining work with parenting for 
al l families) . 
ss See, e.g., Funiciello, supra note 11, at 269 -72, 308-09 (advocating accounting women's 
work in the home as part of 1:h.e gross n2,tionai product); Pearce, supra note 27, at 275 
(arguing that the welfare system cannot be fun damentally changed wi thout cha llenging the 
distinction between women's paid work in the JY1arke t and unpaid work in the home). See 
also Martha A. Fineman, The j'.feutered Mother, the Sexua l Family and Other Twentieth 
Century Tragedies (1995) (arguing that the ailocation of depe ndent care is typica lly 
gendered and that gendered role divisions frustrate the family 's ability as a social 
instituti on to care for de pendents); Finernan, supra note 40 (sam e) . On the debate among 
feminists about whe ther the ir welfare strategy should center on providing working mothers 
with support or on demanding payments for women to care for their ch ildren, see Brenner, 
supra note 26, at 125-29. 
